











Abstract—Recently, Drive-by-Download attacks have been 
prevailing. A user’s PC may be infected with a malware derived 
from tampered web pages. Malicious attackers easily construct 
Drive-by-Download websites using a software tool, called Exploit 
Kit. This paper proposes a new method for detecting 
Drive-by-Download attacks and preventing download of 
malwares. Our method is based on fine-grained analysis of 
Drive-by-Download attacks based on HTTP Context-Types. We 
also evaluate a new detection method for detecting 
Drive-by-Download attacks, whose effectiveness is proved by the 
experimental results. 
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The threat of web-based malwares has been increasing 
recently. A typical web-based malware is known as 
Drive-by-Download attacks [1]. If a user’s browser or plug-in 
has some vulnerability, attackers may exploit it. When a user 
begins to browse some web pages, he/she will be 
automatically guided to download a malware. A malware 
called ransomware has recently become popular [2]. 
Ransomware encrypts user files on an infected machine and 
requests the user to pay some amount of money in order to 
decrypt the files. 
There are some methods for detecting Drive-by-Download 
attacks, which are effective against known web-based attacks. 
Using these methods, we can compile blacklists and match 
them against known signatures. However, Drive-by-Download 
attacks have diversified over time and have resulted in new 
attacks. For example, attackers may frequently change their IP 
addresses and domain names to escape the blacklists. A 
malicious script may be obfuscated to avoid signature pattern 
matching. 
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Thus, we certainly need a new method for detecting new 
attacks. 
 
B. New Approach 
This paper proposes a new defense method for malware 
downloading, which is based on a fine-grained analysis of 
Drive-by-Download attacks. Our new method combines 
several detection mechanisms that are effective for each stage 
of Drive-by-Download attacks.  
The new method can detect attacks in real time because it 
judges an attack during HTTP communications. It uses 
common features in web-based malware, and is effective 
against new (unknown) malwares. 
 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the mechanism of Drive-by-Download attacks. The 
HTTP header is explained in section III. Section IV presents a 
proposal of our new method. Our evaluation results of 
evaluation are shown in section V. Section VI concludes this 
paper with possible future research. 
 
II. MECHANISM OF DRIVE-BY-DOWNLOAD 
A. Mechanism of Drive-by-Download Attacks 
Drive-by-Download attacks exploit vulnerabilities in 
browsers and plug-ins. Malware that infects user PCs by these 
attacks is called web-based malware. It is not easy for users to 
defend themselves from these attacks even if they are very 
cautious. A user’s PC is attacked when the user simply looks 
at a website.  
Drive-by-Download attacks have targeted PC browsers. 
Now, Android OS has become a target for 
Drive-by-Download attacks [3]. 
 Fig. 1 shows the mechanism of Drive-by-Download attacks. 
It starts at some website. The Redirector page is the first step 
to be hit by the attack, which may originally be a benign page 
that is tampered to inject a malicious script. Shortened URLs 
in SNS are becoming increasingly popular [4]. 
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Fig. 1.  Drive-by-Download Attack 
 
B. Exploit Kit of Drive-by-Download Attacks 
Exploit Kit is the generic name of the tool kits that cyber 
criminals use for Drive-by-Download attacks. They induce 
victims to a website where an Exploit Kit is installed. There 
are various types of Exploit Kits which use a wide variety of 
vulnerabilities [5]. 
According to the IBM Tokyo SOC report [6,7], 66.1% of 
Drive-by-Download attacks observed in the first half of 2014 
used vulnerability of Java Runtime Environment (JRE), and 
15.5% used vulnerability of the Adobe Flash player. The trend 
is changing rapidly, with 99.0% of Drive-by-Download 
attacks in the first half of 2015 having used vulnerabilities of 
the Adobe Flash player. This trend change might have resulted 
from the improvement in the security level of JRE. This 
indicates that the type of Exploit Kit and the vulnerability used 
for attacks is evolving. 
 
C. Related Works 
There are several related works for detecting 
Drive-by-Download attacks. We summarize here two related 
papers. 
 
Sakai et al. [8] proposed a detection method based on HTTP 
headers.  In their method, three fields in the HTTP 
header—X-Powered-By, Content-Type and Date—are used to 
detect Drive-by-Download attacks. X-Powered-By shows the 
PHP version, Content-Type indicates the file type, and Date is 
the timestamp of HTTP response. Their approach realizes a 
lightweight process because they do not analyze the data part 
(payload) of the HTML packets and executable files. The 
limitation of their method is the low detection accuracy and 
the low true positive rate. The accuracy of their method is 
88.2%, and the true positive rate is 80.0%. 
 
Kasama et al. [9] investigated several Exploit Kits. They 
attempted to detect Drive-by-Download attacks by using the 
obtained characteristics of Exploit Kits. If a 
Drive-by-Download attack has the characteristics of an 
existing Exploit Kit within their composition, then this 
approach can detect unknown types of attacks. However, their 
approach cannot detect attacks made by a new Exploit Kit and 
attacks without Exploit Kits. Thus, their method is entirely 
based on the analysis of Exploit Kits. 
III. HTTP HEADER 
A. HTTP Protocol [10] 
HTTP is a well-known protocol that is used to send and 
receive contents between a client and an HTTP server. HTTP 
communications include HTTP requests and responses. A 
client sends an HTTP request to a server based on the URL 
information in a browser. The server sends back an HTTP 
response to the client when it receives the HTTP request. 
 
B. HTTP Request 
In Fig. 2, a client sends an HTTP request to a server to get 
contents indicated by a URL.  The server that receives the 
HTTP request understands that the client has used the GET 
method in the HTTP protocol and has requested test.html in 
hoge.com. Some additional information such as User-Agent 
and Referer is also included in the header. The server 
processes the HTTP request based on the header information 
and returns the HTTP response. 
 
GET /test.html HTTP/1.1 
Accept: */* 
Accept-Language: en-us 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows 
NT 5.1; Trident/4.0) 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
Referer: http://hoge.com/index.html 
Host: hoge.com 
Fig. 2.  HTTP request header 
 
1) User–Agent in HTTP request 
The User–Agent field in an HTTP header specifies the 
name of the client who sends the HTTP request. The server 
processes the request according to this User–Agent 
information. Furuhata [11] explained that most browsers 
contain a string of “Mozilla” in the User–Agent field. There is 
a historical reason for this string. When Netscape Navigator 
was highly popular among browsers, it has the “Mozilla” 
string in the User–Agent field. Other browsers simply 
followed them. The Opera browser does not have this 
“Mozilla” string in the User–Agent field. 
 
2) Referer in HTTP request 
The Referer field identifies the information of the website 
that is linked to the resource being requested. By checking the 
Referer field, the current website can see where the request 
came from. In Fig. 2, the HTTP request is sent to 
http://hoge.com/test.html through http://hoge.com/index.html.  
 
C. HTTP Response 
Server sends an HTTP response according to the HTTP 
request from the client. Fig. 3 illustrates an HTTP response 















 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 04:23:30 GMT 
Server: Apache 
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.44 




Fig. 3.  HTTP response header 
1) HTTP Status Code in HTTP response 
HTTP status code is a three-digits code that classifies the 
responses. It indicates the response type by the first one digit 
number. For example, 200s means a success and 400s stands 
for a client error. Table 1 is a list of the HTTP status codes. In 
Fig. 3, the HTTP status code is 200, which means that the 
HTTP response is successful. 
 
TABLE I 
HTTP STATUS CODE 




4xx Client Error 
5xx Server Error 
 
2) Content-Type in HTTP response 
The Content-Type field specifies the type of the file that the 
server sends to the client. The client processes the file 
according to this field. The Content-Type field is represented 
as a MIME type: “type/subtype.” In Fig. 3, MIME type is 
“text/html,” which means a text file. MIME type may 
sometimes be made up of multiple types in a single file format. 
For example, javascript files have two MIME types 
“text/javascript” and “application/javascript”. 
 
D. Other HTTP header fields 
In this paper, we use other HTTP header fields in addition 
to the ones described above. Table II shows, the HTTP header 
fields used in this paper. 
 
TABLE II 
HTTP HEADER FIELDS 
Field Name Description 
User-Agent Client Name 
Content-Type Type of File 
Content-Disposition Handling Information 
X-Powered-By Version of PHP 
 
IV. PROPOSED METHOD 
A. New Approach 
We propose a new method to prevent the downloading of 
web-based malwares. Our method is an extended version of 
Sakai [8] and covers more header fields and provides more 
detailed clarification of clarifies discrimination criteria than 
Sakai [8]. Our method achieves high accuracy rate during 
detection. The new method is a combination of three detection 
mechanisms that utilize HTTP Content-Types. Section IV-B, 
deals with text files that have the string of “text” in 
Content-Type. Section IV-C, describes the detection 
mechanism that handles executable files, whose Content-Type 
is listed in Table III. 
 
TABLE III 







B. Detection mechanism for text files 
Text files have a specific Content-Type field in an HTTP 
header. Content-Type has a string of “text.” If a text file 
satisfies at least one of the following conditions, it is judged as 
malignant. 
 
! There is an X-Powered-By field in the HTTP header, 
which meets at least one of the following conditions: 
" There is a string of “eval” in HTTP data 
" There is a string of “slice” in HTTP data 
" There is a string of “iframe” in HTTP data 
! The “User-Agent” field has a string of “Java” 
 
The first condition tries to detect Redirector pages in 
Drive-by-Download attacks. The major role of a Redirector 
page is to redirect a user’s access to an exploited page, as 
shown in Fig. 1. In many cases, a JavaScript that performs the 
redirection is obfuscated, and it is not easy to analyze an 
obfuscated JavaScript. Our method tries to detect functions 
such as “eval” or “slice,” which are often seen in an 
obfuscated JavaScript. This is the reason why we find a focus 
on “eval” and “slice”. There is another redirection method that 
displays a web page by “iframe,” and is often seen in 
Drive-by-Download attacks. Our condition covers “iframe” as 
well.  
It is necessary to investigate HTTP data, which are usually 
larger than the HTTP header, to search these strings. To 
reduce the analysis cost, we investigate HTTP data only when 
the header has an X-Powered-By field. This field is known to 
be effective in detecting Drive-by-Download attacks [8]. By 
using this field, we realize a high-accuracy detection while 
suppressing the analysis cost by restricting the target HTTP 
data.  
The second condition focuses on Java which is a typical 
vulnerable spot used by Drive-by-Download attacks. This 
condition aims to detect attacks using Java. The false positive 
rate of this condition is very small because benign HTTP 
communications whose User–Agent field has “Java” are 
unlikely. 
 
C. Detection mechanism for executable file 
This section proposes a detection mechanism for an 
exploited page shown in Fig. 1. We have already surveyed the 
executable files format in Table III, which have a specific 
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 Content-Type in the HTTP header. If an executable file meets 
at least one of the following conditions, it is judged as 
malignant. 
 
! There is an X-Powered-By field in the HTTP header 
! There is a Content-Disposition field in the HTTP header, 
and the value of this field is “inline” 
 
The first condition is explained by the same reason as the 
detection mechanism for text files. Note that we investigate 
only HTTP headers to analyze executable files, and do not 
investigate HTTP data (payload) at all. 
In the second condition, “Content-Disposition” is a field for 
displaying an inline element or for downloading a file as an 
attachment element. If a HTTP server sets 'inline' to this field 
and gives a filename, his/her browser will immediately display 
the files as an inline element. 
In a Drive-by-Download attack, this field is used to run a 
malicious file automatically as an inline element. Focus on 
this Content-Disposition field realizes an effective detection 
mechanism. 
D. Detection mechanism for IP addresses 
If a malicious file is detected by the two detection 
mechanisms explained above, we record the IP address of the 
server and put it into a blacklist. Afterwards, when an HTTP 
communication starts with the registered IP address in the 
blacklist, the server site is classified as malicious.  
 
V. EVALUATION 
A. Data set for Experiment 
We use a dataset of Drive-by-Download attacks: D3M2012 
to D3M2015 [12—15][16] and Threatglass [17]. D3M is a 
series of datasets of Drive-by-Download attacks collected by 
Marionette [18], which is a highly interactive web client 
honeypot of NTT Secure Platform Laboratories. The OS of 
Marionette is Windows XP and the web browser is Internet 
Explorer 6.0. They have implemented several plug-ins, 
including Adobe Reader, Flash Player, Win Zip, Quick Time, 
and JRE. Marionette does not include the communications 
data by the malware itself after infection because it does not 
allow the execution of malware.  
Threatglass was invented by Barracuda Labs, which have 
posted considerable information on their website about 
Drive-by-Download attacks. We use a certain amount of data 
from Threatglass. 
We also captured packets for benign data in a campus 
network. The collected data may include malicious data. 
Therefore, we extract only the normal communications data by 
filtering the packets under the conditions in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4.  Condition of malicious data 
 
B. Experiment outline 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we 
conduct different experiments for malicious dataset and 
benign dataset. Experiment 1 uses malicious dataset to 
calculate the detection rate and experiment 2 uses benign 
dataset to calculate the error detection rate. 
In experiment 1, it is necessary to count the accurate 
number of attacks in the dataset before applying the new 
method. We conduct a preliminary experiment to sort out the 
dataset that consists of captured packets. The result contains a 
series of successful attacks whose number is precisely counted. 
Then, we will conduct experiment 1 to measure the detection 
rate of Drive-by-Download attacks.  
The preliminary experiment is divided into three steps. First, 
we count the number of pairs of HTTP request and response 
pairs. Next, we label the page transition in 
Drive-by-Download attacks. Finally, we count the number of 
successful malware downloading. 
In experiment 2, it is also necessary to count the accurate 
number of pairs of HTTP request and HTTP response pairs in 
the benign dataset. Then, we can measure the error rate of the 
newly proposed method. 
 
C. Number of Drive-by-Download Attacks 
We conduct a preliminary experiment to extract meaningful 
data from the dataset. 
 
1). Count the number of pairs of HTTP request and HTTP 
response pairs 
2). Estimate the source and the destination of a transition  
3). Count the number of attacks 
 
1) Count the number of pairs of HTTP request and response 
An HTTP communication is an HTTP request and response 
pair. A pair is represented as a vector with four elements 
(source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port). If a 
client uses the same port number more than once for the same 
destination IP address, the first port number in chronological 
order is used. Other duplicated port numbers are not used in 
the experiment. 
If there are no HTTP responses in the dataset, we will use 
only HTTP request as a pair. If there is no HTTP requests, 
while there is a certain HTTP response, we remove the 
response from the dataset. 
 
2) Estimating the source and the destination of a transition  
A malicious dataset consists of Drive-by-Download attacks. 
An attack triggered by a redirection which has a transition 
source page and a destination page. We estimate the source 
and destination pages by the URL and the IP address before or 
after the transition according to the relationship. 
 
! Referer URL 
" If there is a Referer field in and HTTP request, the 
URL indicates the page before the transition. 
! Location URL 
The HTTP header satisfies at least one of the following 
! There is no Accept field 
! User–Agent does not include Mozilla or Opera 
! User–Agent includes strings reminiscent of the bot 
" api, application, bat, bot, crawl, exe, hunny, 
pot, program 
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 " If there is a Location field in and HTTP response, 
the URL in the value is the new page after the 
transition. 
! URL String 
" If there is a URL String in an HTTP data, this 
URL is the new page after the transition. 
! IP Address 
" If an earlier HTTP response in chronological order 
has the same client IP address, the earlier response 
is the previous page before the transition. 
 
Our method refers to the earlier work by Takata [19]. 
3) Count the number of attacks 
Based on the estimated transition relations, we can extract 
successful Drive-by-Download attacks from the dataset. In Fig. 
5, a file icon represents a file in an HTTP communications, 
including, HTML, javascript, CSS, and image. An arrow in 
Fig. 5 indicates a page transition, including a redirection. At 
the top of the figure a large icon of file A represents an HTTP 
data retrieved from the server URL. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Successful HTTP communication 
 
 
Our concern is whether it is possible to prevent the 
download of malware caused by a Drive-by-Download attack. 
However, the D3M dataset contains interrupted 
communications which are unsuccessful attacks. They do not 
include the malware download. It is necessary to exclude such 
unsuccessful attacks. 
D3M dataset and Threatglass dataset consist of 
Drive-by-Download attacks. If there is an executable file in 
the dataset, it is expected to be a malware. It is possible to 
check whether an HTTP communication contains a malware. 
If an HTTP communication contains an executable file, it has 
a malware. There are three conditions to find an executable 
file: 
 
! A file extension is .exe 
! Content-Type is shown in Table III 
! A PE format file is an executable file in MS Windows 
 
If a file meets at least one of the above conditions, and the 
associated HTTP status code is 2XX (success), then the file is 
regarded as an executable file. We extract successful attacks 
from the dataset with one or more executable files. 
 
D. Experiment 1: detection rate for malicious dataset 
The performance evaluation is conducted by applying the 
proposed method to the malicious dataset prepared in the 
previous section.  
It is better to explain the meaning of preventing malware 
download. Fig. 6 is an example of a Drive-by-Download 
attack, where file G is a malware. If we block the downloading 
of file C, it also blocks downloading file E and file F. 
However, this blocking is not related to file G which is 
malicious. It is necessary to determine whether file D is 
malicious or file G is malicious. If any file in a series of 
transitions to reach the malware is found malignant by the 
proposed method, it is called a successful “prevention,” and an 
unsuccessful “prevention” otherwise. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Example of Drive-by-Download Attack 
 
Using the term “prevention,” the results of the evaluation 
experiments are shown in Table IV. 
 
TABLE IV 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
Dataset Prevention Number of Data 
D3M2015 13 21 
D3M2014 42 43 
D3M2013 19 19 
D3M2012 29 30 
Threatglass 41 51 
Total 144 164 
 
The true positive rate is 87.8%. There are eight unsuccessful 
preventions in D3M2015, six of which are attacks that uses the 
same Exploit Kit. It is not easy to detect these attacks because 
the transition to a malware is implemented by an obfuscated 
javascript. It can also not be detected by the X-Powered-By 
field test. We will visit this issue in the Conclusion of this 
paper. 
 
E. Experiment 2:error detection rate for benign dataset 
In experiment 2, the proposed method is applied to the 
HTTP communication data that was prepared in Section V-C 
from the benign dataset. The performance evaluation includes 
the evaluation of the number of false positives. The results are 












 TABLE V 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2 






Text 21 1353 1.55 
Executable 1 65 1.53 
All 171 6386 2.68 
 
The false positive rate for both text files and executable 
files is around 1.5%. The total false positive rate is increased 
to about 2.7%. The reason of this 2.7% is the error detection 
by IP addresses which is described in Section IV-D of this 
paper. 
 
F. Summary of Results 
The results of experiment 1 and 2 are presented in Table VI. 
 
TABLE VI 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 AND EXPERIMENT 2 
  Result 
 Total Malicious Benign 
Total 6550 164 6386 
Malicious 164 144 20 
Benign 6386 171 6215 
 
 The accuracy of our detection mechanism is 97.1%. Thus, 
our detection mechanism exhibits improved accuracy and 




This paper focuses on the structure of Drive-by-Download 
attacks and tries to prevent malware download by the 
detection mechanism for each attack stage. The results show 
that the proposed method is effective for attacks in datasets. 
The proposed method realizes a low-cost detection, and also 
enables real-time detection, during web-browsing 
communications. 
This method is based on the features of a wide range of 
Drive-by-Download attacks, and is not limited to a specific 
Exploit Kit. Therefore, it would be effective against unknown 
new attacks. 
 
B. Future Research 
1) Improvement of estimation of redirect structure 
We used the method presented in Section V-C to extract 
successful attacks. However, there may be a page transition 
that is not estimated correctly. For example, there is an 
operation of reading a particular file after a certain period of 
time by the “settimeout” function of javascript. The function 
can be obfuscated. In this operation, the URL does not appear 
because of obfuscation. We use an IP black list in the 
proposed method; however, IP addresses may change with 
time. If an HTTP communication occurs for other files by the 
same IP address during a specified predetermined time by the 
“settimeout” function, an incorrect estimation may occur. 
We also find an incorrect estimation about a URL as the 
transition destination, and hence need more data analyses to 
improve our method’s accuracy. 
 
2) Improvement in the proposed method 
The proposed method adopts the features that are discussed 
in various related literature. By improving the proposed 
method to analyze the characteristics of various Exploit Kits, a 
more precise detection can be expected. In particular, there is 
room for improving signature matching with HTTP 
communications data.  
Our proposed method can be used for real-time detection, and 
can be implemented it as a plug-in to a web browser. 
 
3) Verification of a various dataset 
In this paper, we use D3M2012 to D3M2015 and 
Threatglass as the datasets for Drive-by-Download attacks. 
We have not yet investigated the appropriate Exploit Kit to be 
used for each attack. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the 
performance of the various Exploit Kits in the study. 
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